My research combines economic theory and frontier computational econometric methods to study price discrimination strategies and how they affect consumers. I focus on how firms can price discriminate effectively when facing dynamic and strategic consumers. Through a partnership with a North American airline, I examine various pricing mechanisms including dynamic pricing, upgrade auctions, and personalized discounting. I am currently exploring how consumers' flexibility across departure dates affects their price sensitivity and the impact of this flexibility on market definitions in air travel. In the future, I aim to apply these approaches to broader questions in industrial organization and other market settings.

Publications

  • "Should I Stay or Should I Go? An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Behavior Using Airline Web-Traffic Data" with Garrett Scott, Drew Van Kuiken, and Jonathan W. Williams. Economics of Transportation. 10.1016/j.ecotra.2025.100425
    • Abstract

      We analyze consumer search and purchase behavior in response to airline revenue-management practices using data from a major carrier's website and Google Flights. We first describe patterns in search timing, purchase decisions, and paid fares. Then we estimate a multinomial logistic regression to identify factors driving search timing, finding that single adults with loyalty status, especially booking one-way nonstop itineraries, tend to search closer to departure. Next, we use a binary logistic model of conversions of searches to sales, showing that competitors' prices and changing customer composition explain rising conversion probabilities as departure nears. Finally, using a fixed-effects regression, we reveal how search and booking patterns affect prices paid. Late-arriving travelers, particularly single adults with loyalty status, pay substantially more, consistent with the airline's pricing strategies that segment more inelastic customers. Overall, our findings underscore how revenue-management, competitor fares, and consumer characteristics jointly shape online search and purchase behavior.

Working Papers

  • "Revenue Management with Reallocation" with Garrett Scott and Jonathan W. Williams.
    • Abstract

      We develop a model to study the trade-offs associated with introducing re-allocative mechanisms into dynamic-pricing environments with heterogeneous goods and strategic consumers. Our focus is on airlines that sell seats in vertically-differentiated cabins and provide upgrade opportunities after an initial purchase via auctions and fixed-price sales. If consumers anticipate opportunities for an improved reallocation and reduce outright purchases of premium seats, the screening intention of dynamically-set prices can be undermined to create circumstances with a greater probability of upgrades and an ambiguous impact on profits. To study ways to adapt these mechanisms to better complement dynamic-pricing practices, we estimate the model's structural parameters using proprietary data from an airline that includes the price for each itinerary, daily cabin-specific seat inventories for each flight, bids and purchases of upgrades, and information on visits and purchases on the airlines' website. We find that the mechanisms, as implemented, transfer a modest amount of surplus from the airline to consumers. In counterfactual calculations, we explore two ways to improve integration and performance. We find that profits and total welfare increase by either introducing state-specific reserve values to provide commitment for the airline to make the auction less accommodating to strategic consumers or making pricing policies dependent on submitted bids to internalize the option value of the auction while setting prices.

  • "Are Auctions an Upgrade to Revenue Management? Evidence from the Airline Industry" with Garrett Scott and Jonathan W. Williams. Draft available upon request.
    • Abstract

      We develop a model to study the profitability of complementing traditional revenue-management practices for selling vertically-differentiated goods with auctions and fixed-price sales to allocate upgrades. The effect on profits is ambiguous because strategic consumers can exploit the airline's lack of commitment by opting for an economy fare and increasing the probability that upgrades are awarded in equilibrium. The magnitude depends on properties of the demand process and level of awareness among consumers regarding the upgrade opportunities. To measure this trade-off in practice, we use data from a major airline that includes information on ticket sales, aircraft inventory, and bids for and fixed-price sales of upgrades. For identification purposes, we exploit an experiment that introduced a pre-travel email to increase consumer awareness regarding the upgrade opportunities. We find that the notification effort doubled auction participation and bid revenue, but decreased overall revenue due to a reduction in outright premium seat purchases. However, consistent with the model's predictions, the effect varies in sign and magnitude across different types of markets. Generally, our work highlights the challenges with integrating silo'd algorithmic decision-making processes in settings with equilibrium effects.

Works in Progress

  • "Personalized Pricing in the Airline Industry" with Andrii Babii, Garrett Scott, and Jonathan W. Williams.
  • "Consideration Sets with Intertemporally Related Goods: Evidence from an Airline"

Other Writing

Code